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Focusing on potential economic development in Asia and acknowledging the 
stake of U.S. interests in the region, the United States has tried to foster secure 
international circumstances and promote cooperation among Asian countries. These U.S. 
efforts have been manifested most recently in the “Pivot to Asia” or “Asia rebalancing 
policy.” But, contrary to the intention of the rebalancing policy, the security environment 
of Northeast Asia has become unstable while all actors pursue their respective security 
and national interests. Given this current situation, this thesis focuses on the following 
question: Is the U.S. rebalancing policy toward Asia contributing to Northeast Asia 
stability? 
To address this question, this thesis tests a hypothesis: The Asia rebalancing 
policy affects Northeast Asia instability through the Northeast Asian countries’ various 
reactions to U.S. rebalancing. Using the analyses of the reactions of regional powers in 
the subcategories of diplomacy, military, and nuclear, this research assesses how 
Northeast Asian countries interact with the U.S. approach and whether the process of 
interaction contributes to the rebalancing goals of the United States. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
With the premise that the Asia-Pacific region would be critical to future 
international relations, the United States introduced its “reorienting” policy to Asia.1 
There was also some level of anticipation that the U.S. investments into this area would 
be rewarded politically, economically, and militarily through the cooperation of key 
pivot partners.2 Focusing on this potential possibility of economic development 
and acknowledging the chance of U.S. interest, Washington has tried to foster 
secure international circumstances to promote cooperation among Asian countries. 
So, to emphasize cooperation and facilitate U.S. economic gains, U.S. policy makers 
have let the country’s military power assure the security of Asia-Pacific. This grand 
strategy of the United States was called “Pivot to Asia” or “Asia rebalancing policy.” 
The regional security situation of Asia, however, has become unstable while all 
actors pursue their respective security and national interests. This is especially true in 
Northeast Asia, where South Korean and Japanese officials currently perceive China’s 
growing military power as an encountered or potential threat to their national security. 
China’s effort to resist the strategic behaviors of the United States and its allies and to 
keep its security and interests is also building military tension. Given this current 
situation, this thesis answers the following question: Is the U.S. rebalancing policy 
toward Asia contributing to Northeast Asian stability? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The Asia rebalancing policy is the Obama administration’s main strategy toward 
Asia, and many Asian countries have constructed close relations with Washington under 
the keynote of rebalancing. In Northeast Asia, all nations except North Korea have 
improved relationships in accordance with the rebalancing policy. South Korea and Japan 
1 Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, “Far Eastern Promises: Why Washington Should Focus on Asia,” 
Foreign Affairs 93, no. 3 (2014), ProQuest (1520424131). 
2 Ibid. 
2 
have been strong allies of the United States, and these countries are now the essential 
partners in the U.S. rebalance. Participating in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
system, tightening security relationships, and increasing diplomatic engagements are 
meaningful advancements of the rebalancing. Notably, Japan has become the most 
valuable partner in the U.S. rebalance through multiple high-level engagements, 
including the bilateral summit. China also has tried to establish a constructive 
relationship with the United States. China has recognized that past confrontations with 
the United States did not help its national interests, so official high-level engagement to 
promote a more cooperative relationship is progressing in several ways. 
Despite these efforts toward cooperation, there are still tensions between 
Northeast Asian countries that are causing regional security problems. China is showing 
great repulsion to the U.S. military’s involvement in Northeast Asia, and some scholars 
and officers even argue that Washington wants to use its allies to “contain” Beijing. 
Contrary to this theory, Northeast Asia’s U.S. allies, who are concerned about the 
potential danger of growing Chinese military power, are becoming more dependent on 
the alliance system, which provokes China militarily. In addition, North Korea’s nuclear 
arsenal is intensifying this antagonistic structure by causing U.S. allies to rely on U.S. 
nuclear deterrence assets such as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Missile 
(THAAD) and by keeping its distance from China due to its hesitation in pressuring the 
North Korea regime. 
To find a peaceful solution to this complex situation in Northeast Asia and to 
construct a more stable basis for further cooperation and development in the region, this 
thesis reevaluates whether or not the U.S. rebalancing of Asia promotes stability. 
Considering that the United States has huge leverage over Northeast Asia region, critical 
evaluation of the U.S. policy is appropriate for the region, and this process provides the 
opportunity to evaluate how Northeast Asian players cope with the implications of U.S. 
foreign policy. 
3 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, the Asia Rebalancing Policy, along with its shortcomings and the 
problems it has encountered, are reviewed. 
1. The Intention of the Asia Rebalancing Policy
Since former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton first discussed the “pivot to 
Asia” in 2011, there have been several arguments about this concept.3 Scholars and 
government officials from several countries analyzed the U.S. pivot using their own 
perspectives of Asia region. Even in the United States, the interpretation of the U.S. pivot 
to Asia policy has not yet coincided among professional researchers. These different 
views about the U.S. policy reflect the facts that U.S. activities in Asia can be understood 
in diverse ways and that there can be a gap between the intent of Washington and how 
other countries recognize the policy. 
The U.S. rebalancing policy, originally known as pivot to Asia, means the U.S. 
national focus will shift to Asia for the purpose of achieving U.S. national goals. This 
policy, however, does not suggest that the United States is becoming newly interested in 
Asia region. U.S. presence in Asia has had a long history. The United States 
acknowledged the value of Asia region more than two centuries ago, and it has since 
interacted with Asia in various ways, “including business, religious groups, educational 
organizations, foundations, and the media.”4 World War II motivated the United States to 
pay greater attention to the Asia-Pacific region as a way to further its national interests, 
and the Cold War made this region more valuable to America “militarily, economically, 
and diplomatically.” 5  The post-Cold War governments, the Clinton and Bush 
administrations, also showed vigorous engagements with Asia region. Their engagements 
included emphasizing the usefulness of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 
3 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy 189 (November 2011): 57, ProQuest 
(925702002). 
4 Robert G. Sutter, Michael E. Brown, and Timothy J. A. Adamson, “Balancing Acts: The U.S. 
Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Stability,” RPI Policy Report (August 2013): 5, 
http://www.risingpowersinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/BalancingActs_Compiled1.pdf. 
5 Ibid., 1. 
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engaging and deterring China, making solid relationships with partners through economy 
and security issues, and executing joint exercises.6 As U.S. efforts in Asia have continued 
for centuries, the rebalancing policy toward Asia can be regarded as the redistribution of 
U.S. national abilities and the reestablishment of regional priority in policy making.7 
The original intent of the rebalancing policy was to strengthen the relationship 
through U.S. alliances and multilateral institutions by sharing economic benefits. Military 
involvement would ensure a peaceful security environment for the improvement of 
relations. This idea of the rebalancing policy can be noted in the article that Hillary 
Clinton wrote in Foreign Policy, “America’s Pacific Century.” She proclaimed the 
necessity of U.S. investment in the Asia-Pacific area and foresaw that the Asia-Pacific 
area would be “a key of global politics.”8 With respect to alliances, improving allies’ 
defense capabilities toward the common objectives was the key point in the new security 
circumstances, which were characterized by “new opportunities,” “new challenges,” and 
“provocation from the full spectrum of state and [non-state] actors.”9 Redistributing U.S. 
forces in Asia region to react more efficiently to security problems was another way of 
upgrading security and stability.10 Focusing on the economic investment opportunities in 
the Asia-Pacific region and the resulting benefits for U.S. economic restoration, President 
Obama also attempted to keep “peace and security” of this area by controlling and 
modifying the military characteristics of the area’s players. 11 Consequently, the Asia 
rebalancing policy could be considered a cooperation-increasing policy in the economic 
area through an expansion of U.S. contacts in Asian nations, and strengthening its 
military power and relationships with allied countries provided a stable situation for the 
animated inter-state cooperation. 
                                                 
6 Sutter, Brown, and Adamson, “Balancing Acts,” 5–7. 
7 Ibid., 7. 
8 Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” 57. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., 62. 
11 Ibid. 
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Interpretations that are similar to this original intention of the rebalancing policy 
have been shared between several scholars. Robert G. Sutter et al. say, “the rebalancing 
has been driven by a much broader set of strategic, economic, and political 
considerations,” and “the fundamental goals of the new U.S. policy are to broaden areas 
of cooperation beneficial to the United States with regional states and institutions.”12 
Bryan P. Truesdell, a colonel in the U.S. Army, focuses on “Asia-Pacific’s substantial 
population growth, diversity and abundant natural resources combined with the extensive 
economic growth across the region,” and views the rebalancing policy as “ensuring the 
U.S. can continue to influence the stability and security of the Asia-Pacific region and be 
able to participate in the vast economic potential there.” 13 Like these authors, most 
scholars embrace the original concept and peaceful intention of the rebalancing policy.  
There is another interpretation of the U.S. rebalancing policy among scholars and 
officials: containing or countering China. Robert S. Ross regards the rebalancing policy 
as “a shift in strategy aimed at bolstering the United States’ defense ties with countries 
throughout the region and expanding the U.S. naval presence.”14 Following his argument, 
the Unites States needs to reinforce its military power in Asia and reassure partner states 
with enhanced U.S. presence; at the same time it should consider the rise of Chinese 
military capabilities and the worries of its allies in Asia region.15 Christopher Layne 
views the rebalancing policy as “an attempt to contain the rise of a potential hegemon, 
such as China.” 16  He calls this activity “off-shore balancing,” characterized as the 
dependence on “naval and air power” and “burden-sharing with Pacific Rim allies.”17 In 
response, Phillip C. Saunders says, “this group emphasizes military elements of the 
12 Sutter, Brown, and Adamson, “Balancing Acts,” 9. 
13 Bryan P. Truesdell, “Balance within the Rebalance: The Supporting Role of the U.S. Military in the 
Asia-Pacific Region,” Asia Pacific Security Study (June 2014): 2, http://www.apcss.org/wp-content/
uploads/2014/06/Truesdell-Rebalance-2014.pdf. 
14 Robert S. Ross, “The Problem with the Pivot: Obama’s New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and 
Counterproductive,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 6 (2012), ProQuest  (1223496273). 
15 Ibid. 




rebalance, especially U.S. military deployments, the developments of new military 
capabilities, and expanded security cooperation with allies and partners.”18 Scholars of 
this school see the U.S. partners in Asia as players “to challenge Chinese sovereignty and 
provoke China into military overreactions that would damage its strategic position in 
Asia.”19 This view sees the U.S. rebalancing policy as stemming from Washington’s 
concerns about China’s military strengthening and Beijing’s worries about the U.S. 
improving military capabilities. 
As described previously, there are two different viewpoints on the U.S. 
rebalancing policy; one is very close to the original and peaceful concept of the 
rebalancing policy, but the other concentrates on the military aspect of the rebalance. As 
Hillary Clinton saw the Asia-Pacific region as “a key driver of global politics” and 
emphasized the economic potentials of the region, the U.S. rebalancing of Asia is a 
relation-centered and cooperation-aimed national strategy.20 Most scholars share this idea 
and keep their view when they analyze the behavior of the United States. They do not 
think the U.S. intention of rebalance is to contain China. On the contrary, they regard the 
U.S. policy as embracing China through bilateral or multilateral systemic engagements to 
construct a more stable Asia region favorable to sharing the enormous profits that will be 
generated in that area.  
But some scholars’ views do not reflect the official position of the U.S. 
government. This party focuses on the increase in U.S. military troop levels and assets in 
Asia and the advancement of U.S. military strategy to employ them. These scholars also 
look at China’s rising military capabilities and see Asia as the dichotomous area between 
the U.S. camp and the Chinese camp, similar to the world’s division during the Cold War 
era. To them, the U.S. approach to its rebalancing partners are reactions against China 
aimed at consolidating the anti-China military efforts of adjacent countries. 
18 Phillip C. Saunders, “China’s Rising Power, the U.S. Rebalance to Asia, and Implications for U.S.-
China Relations,” Issues & Studies 50, no. 3 (September 2014): 41, http://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/82/
Documents/chinas-rising-power.pdf. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” 57. 
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Consequently, this school argues that the objectives of the U.S. rebalancing policy is 
containing China or balancing China’s growing national power.  
2. Problems in Rebalancing Policy
Despite the peaceful notion of Washington on the rebalance, there are many 
worrying views about the U.S. policy. This concern is originated from judgment about 
instability and tension-rising in Asia region. Scholars who have anxious views about the 
U.S. policy can be classified into two groups: one that finds the policy’s problems lie 
with the United States, and the other that argues the problem is China. 
Claims of the school of blaming the United States are that the U.S. rebalancing 
policy provokes China. Following the argument of Ross, “the Obama administration’s 
pivot has not contributed to stability in Asia;”21 instead, “it has made the region more 
tense and conflict-prone.”22 He argues that China has strong military power to protect the 
regime’s legitimacy and to satisfy the nationalists’ request in the insecure situation of 
“several nerve-racking years of financial crisis and social unrest.”23 He explains this 
choice is inevitable because China’s economic capability is not sufficient to solve those 
financial problems. 24  In this situation, the U.S. rebalance from a military aspect is 
happening on the basis of overassessment of China’s military capabilities and excessive 
security reassurance for the U.S. allies and partners. 25  These U.S. behaviors are 
threatening the will of the Chinese government that wants to prove its legitimacy with 
military strength, so China takes a more aggressive posture “to guarantee its security” 
from the United States and its partners.26 Consequently, U.S. efforts to promote a more 
stable Asia result in a more hostile China and more unstable security circumstances. 







Michael Spangler’s opinion about the rebalance is somewhat similar to Ross’s in 
his perspective that U.S. support to its allies in maritime disputes and reliance on 
multilateral institutions stimulate the security concerns of China.27 He argues that the 
United States’ dependence on the regulative and normative authority of international 
institutions is not helpful in resolving the maritime conflicts between China and its 
partner states.28 According to his argument, because of China’s “refusing to recognize 
the ‘authority’ or ‘expertise’ of international bodies,” Washington should move its 
emphasis from multilateral efforts to bilateral efforts, and through this shift, the 
“rebalancing initiative”—[matching] international security cooperation with robust 
economic activity within the Pacific Rim”—can be achieved easily.29 The common idea 
of this school is that the United States causes the current unstable situation due to its 
incorrect understanding of China. 
Contrary to these scholars, the opposite side criticizes China’s misunderstanding 
and nationalistic movement toward the U.S. rebalancing policy. Sutter et al. point out that 
confrontation between the United States and China around the rebalancing policy was 
lessened with U.S. efforts to engage China more diplomatically and less militarily.30 
Considering that “most regional powers hope that the United States and China will be 
able to work together and . . . promote regional stability and order,” Sutter et al. say that 
China should control its assertiveness to prevent “increased U.S.-China friction that 
would also be unwelcome in the region and at odds with the U.S. interest in regional 
stability.”31 China’s aggressiveness stems from “growing Chinese nationalist sentiment 
and growing military power and other coercive capabilities that are now available to 
Chinese policy makers,” and these factors are hard to be influenced by the United 
States.32 So, Sutter et al. think the Chinese leadership’s decisions and attitude toward 
                                                 
27 Spangler, “Rebalancing the Rebalance,” 13. 
28 Ibid., 18. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Sutter, Brown, and Adamson, “Balancing Acts,” 29. 
31 Ibid., 30. 
32 Ibid. 
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Asia region is key to the successful and peaceful coexistence of the United States and 
China and the pursuit of their national interests.33  
Another scholar, Phillip Saunders, focuses on the “strategic thrust between the 
U.S. and Chinese leaders.”34 In spite of the U.S. effort to explain its non-containing and 
non-aggressive features of the rebalancing policy, Chinese scholars and officials continue 
to suspect the intentions of Washington.35 China does not believe in the fairness of the 
U.S. attitude on maritime disputes and the needs for peaceful cooperation.36 The Chinese 
government even argues that the U.S. commitment makes its partner countries confident 
militarily and that this confidence gives rise to military tension between them and 
China.37 In this situation, to assure U.S. friends and to prevent China’s anxious response, 
Saunders emphasizes establishment of “strategic thrust.”38 As stated previously, scholars 
of this school state that authentic U.S. efforts for a peaceful approach have continued in 
Asia region, but China’s mistrust and misunderstanding makes the U.S. efforts ineffective 
and creates an unstable environment. 
3. Shortcomings of the Current Debate
As just reviewed, studies about the Asia rebalancing policy find the problems of 
the policy in two distinctive areas: China’s confrontational posture toward the United 
States and its partners and the United States’ immature treatment of China. But beyond 
this debate, these analyses all focus too much on the relationship of these two primary 
countries. There are many other independent players in the Asia area. Even though most 
states of this area do not have sufficient diplomatic and military power to stand alone and 
usually rely on the superpower to a certain extent, each state has its own national interests 
and goals, and they interact with other countries to accomplish their national purpose. In 
33 Sutter, Brown, and Adamson, “Balancing Acts,” 30. 
34 Saunders, “China’s Rising Power,” 47. 
35 Ibid., 39. 
36 Ibid., 40. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 47. 
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this process of pursuing national objectives, their behavior cannot always correspond 
with their patronal or friendly countries’ interests. 
This means that the effects of national behavior sometimes can be hard to 
understand in the context of only the U.S.-Sino relationship. Thus, policy analyses 
through the window of the U.S.-Sino relationship can have a limitation. In Northeast 
Asia, there are key players that have their own national strategies and purposes. The 
phenomena happening in this area cannot properly be understood, as too little research 
focuses on each nation’s behavior, its mutual influence, and the interaction among 
countries. This perspective suggests that other Northeast Asian nations form a concrete 
intervening variable between the rebalancing policy and the stability or instability of Asia 
region. To evaluate U.S. policy more objectively and concretely, research is needed to 
understand how these countries function as realistic and analyzable intervening variables. 
Additionally, studies on the rebalance insufficiently highlight the nuclear issues of 
the Northeast Asia area. There has been much research on nuclear issues, but it has not 
concentrated on the relationship between nuclear issues and the rebalancing policy. For 
example, Camilla T. N. Sørensen argues that a “multilateral security mechanism”—such 
as the Six Party Talks—was developed with the need to resolve the North Korea nuclear 
problem, and considering “the ongoing regional power transition following especially 
from the ‘Rise of China’” and the “North Korean nuclear crisis,” the importance of such a 
mechanism is rising in Northeast Asia. 39  Although Sørensen’s solution to Northeast 
Asia’s instability, which she claims is caused by power transitions and North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons, focuses on multilateral and institutional efforts, the relationship 
Sørensen draws between those efforts and the Asia rebalancing policy is weak. Other 
scholars, such as Linton Brooks, Mira Rapp-Hooper, and John S. Park, also researched 
the nuclear issue of Northeast Asia; however, they focus on the problems of U.S. 
                                                 
39 Camilla T. N. Sørensen, “Security Multilateralism in Northeast Asia: A Lost Game or the Only Way 
to Stability,” JCIR 1, no. 1 (2013): 6–15, http://amalthea.aub.aau.dk/index.php/jcir/article/download/214/
151. 
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extended deterrence, and the rebalancing policy was excluded from their debates.40 But, 
the Asia rebalancing policy contains the idea of protecting security in Asia region with 
military force, so, from the perspective that Northeast Asia security is being threatened 
by North Korean nuclear programs and the desire of regional actors to acquire nuclear 
weapons and that the United States is concerned with that issue through the extended 
deterrence commitment, a study on the rebalancing policy must address the U.S. and 
regional players’ behavior with respect to the nuclear issue. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
To better evaluate the Asia rebalancing policy, this thesis tests a hypothesis. This 
hypothesis consists of an independent variable (IV), an intervening variable (IntV), and a 
dependent variable (DV). The IV is the Asia rebalancing policy, and the DV is Northeast 
Asia stability or instability; the IntV are the reactions of other Northeast Asian states. So, 
the hypothesis of this research is that the Asia rebalancing policy affects Northeast Asia 
instability through the Northeast Asian countries’ various reactions to the U.S. 
rebalancing. This hypothesis is tested through empirical evidence in the thesis. 
The Asia rebalancing policy, a national strategy of the United States, shapes U.S. 
international activities in Asia. The national strategy of a state directs its governmental 
behaviors. This means that most national actions are under the influence of a state’s 
national strategy. In the case of the Asia rebalancing policy, the United States aims to 
share various benefits with regional countries via cooperative relationships and militarily 
secure circumstances. So, the debate about the rebalancing policy must include U.S. 
activities in diplomatic, military, and nuclear fields. More specifically, the target of this 
thesis is the U.S. diplomatic, military, and nuclear-related actions in Northeast Asia. 
40 Linton Brooks and Mira Rapp-Hooper say that, compared to the Cold War era, extended deterrence 
of the current Asia-Pacific is harder because of the complexity of interests and threats existing in this area. 
Linton Brooks and Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Extended Deterrence, Assurance, and Reassurance in the Pacific 
during the Second Nuclear Age,” in Strategic Asia 2013–14: Asia in the Second Nuclear Age, ed. Ashley J. 
Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark, and Travis Tanner (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2013), 298; 
John S. Park points out that the problems of credibility of the U.S. extended deterrence cause South 
Korea’s aspiration toward nuclear armament. John S. Park, “Nuclear Ambition and Tension on the Korean 
Peninsula,” in Strategic Asia 2013–14: Asia in the Second Nuclear Age, ed. Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. 
Denmark, and Travis Tanner (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2013), 198. 
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The reactions of each Northeast Asian state to the rebalancing policy are the 
concrete tools used to analyze the process of the U.S. influences on this area. With the 
vigorous engagements of the United States in Northeast Asia, states of the region are 
expressing their own responses. These reactions are the result of interaction between the 
U.S. policy and their own national interests or goals, so Washington could face amicable 
or unfriendly responses according to differences within the countries. 
The most interesting aspect of these reactions is the interaction among the 
regional states. For instance, if the United States announces the dispatch of an aircraft 
carrier to Northeast Asia for a joint exercise with allies, China and North Korea will react 
in a way that strengthens their belligerence regarding local provocations or increases the 
activity of reconnaissance assets. To counter these reactions, South Korea will increase 
its defense alert level and prepare to cope with all possible military conflicts. Japan will 
also pay more attention to its area of territorial dispute to react to a possible military 
dispute with China or will carefully monitor any indication of a North Korean nuclear or 
ballistic missile test that can be seen as a military demonstration. In this manner, the 
response of each country to the U.S. policy influences other countries, which then affects 
regional security circumstances. Thus, this research traces the interconnection of 
Northeast Asian countries’ reactions to the U.S. rebalancing policy to analyze the effects 
of the policy concretely and synthetically. 
By testing the hypothesis and its elements, this thesis provides a chance to 
evaluate the effects of the rebalancing policy concretely, with the value of revealing real 
problems of the policy and proposing practical solutions for instability in Northeast Asia 
region. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The Asia rebalancing policy covers a huge range of U.S. international behavior, 
so it is challenging to analyze all the specific events of the rebalance and all reactions. 
Instead, this research tries to categorize the U.S. balancing behaviors into the three big 
areas: diplomacy, military, and nuclear. The subjects of analysis in each area are the 
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representative actions, plans, or events driven by the rebalancing policy and causing 
reactions among Northeast Asian countries. 
In the diplomatic area, the goal of the United States with regard to the rebalancing 
policy is to improve the range and depth of U.S. engagements. To share in the benefits of 
the Asia area, Washington needs to establish a cooperative relationships with the regional 
powers. Among these regional powers, two sorts of countries are included: traditional 
partners and states with which the United States seeks to revise relationships. In 
Northeast Asia, with its traditional and strong allies of South Korea and Japan, the U.S. 
goal is to develop these alliance relationships into more extensive cooperation 
partnerships beyond the military area. For China, considering its growing national power 
and regional influence, the United States recognizes a sufficient motive for cooperation. 
To increase contacts with these regional countries, the United States uses two kinds of 
diplomatic methods in Northeast Asia: multilateral organization and bilateral diplomacy. 
Thus, this research analyzes U.S. efforts in each field and observes the reaction of each 
country. For instance, for Japan to be a strong rebalance partner, improvement on the 
U.S.–Japan relationship is essential in the rebalancing policy. But, this U.S. bilateral 
effort is sometimes criticized because the U.S.–Japan relation can provide motivation for 
a closer Sino-Russia relationship, and this seems like a prelude to a new Cold War. In this 
way, the U.S. diplomatic efforts for the rebalance and the reactions of Northeast Asian 
countries can be analyzed causally and can help the definite evaluation of the diplomatic 
effects of the Asia rebalancing policy. 
As for the military area, the U.S. rebalancing policy needs the support of military 
forces to guarantee secure environments for vigorous cooperation. So, the role of military 
power in the rebalance is keeping the security of Asia region. Considering that a secure 
situation means the absence of threat, the military force will be constructed and employed 
in the direction of deterring and countering threats. Northeast Asia region is one of the 
areas where military powers are concentrated. To deal with conventional threats, the 
United States is changing its force structure in Northeast Asia region and, at the same 
time, supporting its allies militarily. Thus, with regard to the military field, the Asia 
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rebalancing policy could be abstracted into two subcategories: U.S. conventional efforts 
and joint U.S.–allied conventional efforts. 
Considering that the Asia rebalancing policy is aimed at a secure and peaceful 
environment in Northeast Asia region, it is reasonable to deal with the U.S. nuclear 
policy toward Northeast Asia in this thesis because the nuclear issue in this region is 
closely related to the security environment. To deal with the nuclear problems of this 
region, Washington provides extended deterrence capabilities to its allies and tries to 
denuclearize the region. In this perspective, the U.S. efforts to manage the region’s 
nuclear issue can be studied in three subareas: the extended deterrence commitment, 
efforts to denuclearize North Korea, and controlling the nuclear ambitions of South 
Korea and Japan. 
With the analysis of the reactions of regional powers in the subcategories of 
diplomacy, military, and nuclear, this research tries to figure out how the Northeast Asian 
countries interact with the U.S. approach and whether the process of interaction increases 
or decreases tensions. At the last stage, the thesis considers overall results synthetically 
and draws the conclusion from the test of the hypothesis. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis is comprised of five chapters. In the introduction, current security 
problems of Northeast Asia and regional instability are summarized, and relevant prior 
literature is reviewed. 
The second chapter addresses the diplomatic aspect of the rebalancing policy and 
the reaction of the Northeast Asian states. This chapter’s first section is for analyzing the 
U.S. diplomatic approach to the region through multilateral organizations. The second 
section deals with the U.S. bilateral diplomatic efforts with the two U.S. allies. Analyses 
of reactions of Northeast Asian countries are provided in each section. 
The third chapter focuses on the military aspect of the U.S. rebalance. Its first 
section asks what kind of conventional efforts for regional security the U.S. has practiced 
in Northeast Asia and how the regional states have reacted. The second section evaluates 
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joint conventional efforts of the United States and its allies and their impacts on regional 
stability. 
In the fourth chapter, this thesis focuses on the nuclear issue of Northeast Asia. 
The first section of this chapter examines the U.S. commitment of extended deterrence 
and regional nations’ responses. The next section provides an analysis of how the United 
States tries to denuclearize the Northeast Asia area and how the regional states interact 
with U.S. policy. The last section discusses the U.S. efforts to control the nuclear arming 
of the two key allies of the region.  
In the conclusion, this thesis draws on all of these analyses about the U.S. 
rebalancing policy to judge the merit of the primary hypothesis. 
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II. THE DIPLOMATIC ASPECT OF THE ASIA REBALANCING
POLICY AND ITS IMPLICATION ON NORTHEAST ASIA 
A. THE U.S. MULTILATERAL APPROACH 
Building multilateral cooperation systems is one of the main aims of the Asia 
rebalancing policy. The United States intends to manage regional conflicts and to 
establish cooperation among Asian countries through these cooperative institutions.41 
This is because Washington wishes to create regional order based on regulations and 
consent between states within international institutions. This U.S. policy does not intend 
to pressure China through multilateral institutions. According to Phillip C. Saunders, the 
United States hopes that China will play more roles in Asia together with multilateral 
systems, though these expanded roles of China will inevitably weaken the United States’ 
role in Asia.42 In spite of this anticipation, the direction of the U.S. policy is being 
maintained, and these continued efforts can be viewed as the United States seeking to 
build “trust and confidence” with China.43 This U.S. intention can be acknowledged by 
the fact that the United States invited China to the 2014 Rim of the Pacific Exercise 
(RIMPAC). 44  The United States is seeking to mediate disputes in Asia through 
cooperation, not competition, with China, and to build up peaceful circumstances to 
induce economic prosperity.45 
These multilateral systems for security cooperation, however, serve to create 
conflicts because this multilateral approach from Washington is seen as an assertive 
policy by Beijing. China views these mulilateral entities as methods to strengthen the 
U.S.-centered international order.46 This means that the reasons that China has refused to 
41 Harry Harris, “Multilateral Ties Drive America’s Pacific Rebalance,” The Straits Times, January 21, 
2014, http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/
1490670440?accountid=12702. 
42 Phillip C. Saunders, “The Rebalance to Asia: U.S.-China Relations and Regional Security,” 
Strategic Forum, no. 281 (August 2013): 3, ProQuest (1427458876). 
43 Ibid. 
44 Harris, “Multilateral Ties Drive America’s Pacific Rebalance.” 
45 Ibid. 
46 Saunders, “The Rebalance to Asia,” 3. 
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enter multilateral institutions are based on a worry that China’s independent decision-
making rights could be damaged. 47  Further, China is anxious that it could lose its 
national interests due to the presence of the powerful U.S. influence on those 
institutions. 48  In addition, according to Gyoosang Seol, China refused to join these 
multilateral systems because these systems could be utilized to pressure and contain 
China.49  
In particular, China has viewed multilateral systems as places for competing for 
national interests rather than cooperating. Sukhee Han argues that China is using 
multilateral institutions for its ambitious purposes. According to his view, China has 
resisted U.S. hegemony since the 1990s by utilizing multilateral diplomacy.50 With the 
end of the Cold War, China predicted the world order would transfer to a multipolar 
system in which the strong powers, including the United States, Russia, China, and the 
European Union, would be equal in status; however, the world order still reflects the U.S. 
unipolar system.51 The U.S.-centered unilateralism might be maintained because U.S. 
hard power, such as strong defense and economic capabilities, and U.S. soft power, 
including democratic values and a market economy, are still strong influences. 52 
Additionally, the war on terrorism after the 9/11 attacks made the anti-terror states unite 
with the United States and strengthened the U.S.-centered unipolar order.53 
To break the U.S. unipolar world and move to the multipolar world favorable for 
checking U.S. influence, China has tried utilizing multilateral entities. For instance, the 
reason that China entered into the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was because this 
                                                 
47 Sukhee Han, “Jungguk’ui da’geughwajeonlyag, dajajuui’oegyo, geuligo dongbug Asia anbo 
[Multipolarity Strategy of China, Multilateralism Diplomacy, and the Security of Northeast Asia],” 
International and Regional Study 11, no. 1 (2007): 358–60, http://kiss.kstudy.com/journal/
thesis_name.asp?tname=kiss2002&key=2682332. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Gyoosang Seol, “Dongbug’a anbo dajajuuiwa insiggongdongcheui yeoghal [Security 
Multilateralism in Northeast and the Role of Epistemic Communities],” East and West Study 20, no. 1 
(2008): 13–14, http://sloc.cafe24.com/upload/publication01. 
50 Han, “Multipolarity Strategy of China,” 349–50. 
51 Ibid., 352–53. 
52 Ibid., 353–54. 
53 Ibid., 355. 
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system had the merit of limiting U.S. influence by promoting the “ASEAN way.”54 It can 
be inferred that China is participating in the multilateral institutions to neutralize the 
U.S.-centered regional order, not just to fit China to the existing systems.55 This means 
that China is using the multilateral institutions of the region to restrain the unipolar 
system of the United States, believing that establishing the multipolar order by power 
balancing is realistically impossible.56 
Sukhee Han states that China has improved its international position and 
promoted China-centered international systems since the beginning of the twenty-first 
century.57 Specifically, it has used the Six Party Talks to improve its diplomatic leverage 
within Northeast Asia.58 China negatively perceives that the leverage of other countries 
except China increases in the Korean peninsula, so China opposes the occurrence of 
instability that would justify interventions in adjacent states.59 To support this stance, 
China needs a method to manage unstable situations arising in North Korea and to control 
neighboring countries’ interference, and the Six Party Talks are suitable for this role.60 
Also, the point that China has a superior position in inducing North Korea to the 
negotiating table and giving influence to North Korea’s regime is another reason that 
China prefers the Six Party Talks.61 For China, multilateral institutions have a value as a 
means to check the unipolar clout of the United States and to protect China’s national 
interests. 
Because China perceives multilateral systems for security cooperation as methods 
to procure national interests, peaceful mediation of conflicts through security cooperation 
entities becomes difficult, and the U.S. intention to rebalance Asia through the 
institutions gets hindered. For example, according to a study by Gudrun Wacker, China 
                                                 
54 Han, “Multipolarity Strategy of China,” 360–61. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid., 361. 
57 Ibid., 362. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid., 363–64. 
60 Ibid., 364. 
61 Ibid., 365. 
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had briskly joined the regional security cooperation institutions between the early 1990s 
and the mid-2000s; however, China does not depend on these institutions in the case of 
territorial disputes.62 China tries to solve these disputes within bilateral relations, and 
because of this tendency, Japan becomes more dependent on the support of powerful 
countries such as the United States.63 For Michael Spangler, China seems to continue to 
resist U.S.-led efforts to settle the territorial disputes through international institutions.64 
According to his study, China will not submit to the authority of regional institutions 
existing in Asia, and the Chinese government tends to solve conflicts related to China 
through bilateral dialogue.65 Saunders also argues that China is refusing to deal with the 
issues of sensitive conflicts in places for security cooperation like ARF, and that China 
uses them instead to make aggressive statements against neighboring countries, including 
the United States.66 
Due to China’s uncooperative posture in solving conflicts through multilateral 
systems, states experiencing troubles with China come to select more offensive tones in 
policies related to China. According to Saunders, because of this Chinese attitude, 
adjacent states seek to get anti-Chinese security support by establishing relationships with 
the United States, and these requests provide a motivation for the U.S. rebalancing; 
circularly, the U.S. approach makes China more focused on bilateral solutions to deny the 
increasing U.S. influence, and this Chinese reaction induces additional security demands 
from the pro-American neighbors.67  
For instance, Japan has suffered from a maritime dispute with China since the 
1990s, and China has relied on bilateral methods such as economic sanctions or 
diplomatic engagements to achieve its demands. With the rise of tension levels and the 
                                                 
62 Gudrun Wacker, Security Cooperation in East Asia: Structures, Trends and Limitations (SWP 
Research Paper 2015/RP 04), trans. David Barnes, (Berlin: Stiftung Wissensschaft und Politik, 2015, 
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63 Ibid. 
64 Spangler, “Rebalancing the Rebalance,” 18. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Saunders, “The Rebalance to Asia,” 3–4. 
67 Ibid., 4–5. 
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growth of China’s military power, Japan began to recognize the necessity of 
strengthening security cooperation with the United States to offset the power asymmetry 
between Japan and China.68 To promote a more cooperative relationship, in early 2012 
Japan joined command post exercises with U.S. forces that assumed Chinese intervention 
on Japanese territory, and these kinds of joint exercises between U.S. forces in Japan and 
Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) have since been held several times.69  Also, after 
nationalizing the Senkaku Islands in September 2012, there was an official announcement 
from the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) that the Senkaku Islands were covered 
under the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty.70  
In reaction to this U.S. security support, China tried to thwart U.S. involvement 
and limit the U.S. military’s role in this maritime issue by officially blaming U.S. 
intervention for the rising tensions between China and Japan. China also fortified 
maritime patrols and air reconnaissance around the islands to pressure Japan. China’s 
aggressive actions fueled Japan’s security concerns, so Japan consequently came to seek 
more security support from the United States by revising the U.S.–Japan Defense 
Guideline and strengthening the U.S. extended deterrence commitment. Within this 
vicious circle, anti-Chinese attitudes in China’s adjacent states deepen, and their policies 
toward China become more offensive. Thus, the reactions of states like Japan further 
undermine U.S. desires to promote security multilateralism. 
Similar to this, Wecker insists that, due to the security vacuum that remains 
despite multilateral institutions for security guarantees, bilateral security cooperation 
among Asian countries is rising, and these types of cooperation are occuring at a lower 
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level than alliance relationships. 71  This security cooperation is primaily focused on 
strengthening security without stimulating negative reactions from China. 
Of course, because the United States is rebalancing Asia not for the purpose of 
confronting China but controlling the outbreak of armed conflicts in the region and 
pursuing economic prosperity, Washington will continue trying to build a cooperative 
relationship with Beijing; however, it is evident that China’s aggressive attitude is an 
element that makes the U.S. rebalancing of Asia more complex.72 China continues to act 
as an obstacle to the establishment of collective security cooperation entities in Asia 
region while taking two contradictory attitudes. 73  This means China will neither 
challenge publicly and directly the regional order that the United States has established 
through multilateral institutions, nor cooperate positively with these systems.74 
B. BILATERAL APPROACH 
As a part of the Asia rebalancing policy, the fortification of relationships between 
the United States and key allies in Northeast Asia is progressing, and alliances could 
inspire aggressive responses by Northeast Asian countries, regardless of the U.S. 
intention. This means the security guarantee to the allied countries could cause conflicts 
with China. For example, according to the opinions of Swaine et al., Japan could respond 
to China more belligerently, expecting the United States to support it, based on the 
security commitment, if a maritime territorial dispute happened between China and 
Japan.75 These allied countries’ behaviors contribute to regional instability by causing a 
vicious cycle: those behaviors foment regional tensions by irritating China, and the 
tensions induce a more powerful security commitment from the United States.76 
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In a similar perspective, Saunders points out that China argues that the U.S. allies 
have maintained a tough military policy against China due to the Asia rebalancing 
policy.77 This means that China perceives that the states receiving security support from 
the United States are encroaching on Chinese sovereignty, while Chinese foreign policy 
has not been changed to an aggressive one.78 China tries to cooperate with the United 
States through the “new model of great power relations” and seeks to solve the maritime 
dispute against U.S. allied countries through the bilateral relationship with the state 
directly involved.79 The United States also continuously has advocated the arbitration of 
disputes based on the international regulations and laws while clarifying that the Senkaku 
Islands are covered by the U.S.–Japan alliance.80 Saunders worries that Japan, in contrast 
to the unaggressive United States, is setting up its policy of maritime disputes not to 
negotiate and concede, but to accept military collisions.81 As the military tension caused 
by the aggressive posture is continued, the possibility of Japan’s breakaway from the 
nonproliferation regimes and the subsequent rupture of the alliance could increase.82 
In addition, the strengthening of the alliance system could lead to unnecessary 
confrontation in Northeast Asia region. According to In Ho Lee, consolidation of the 
U.S.–Japan alliance based on the Asia rebalancing policy, named “the new U.S.–Japan 
honeymoon,” is motivating the type of U.S.-China competition and the Sino-Russian 
cooperation that cause regional instability of Northeast Asia. 83  In the context of 
reinforcing the U.S.–Japan alliance, the change in the legal interpretation of Japan’s 
collective self-defense rights was primarily implemented, and this change was welcomed 
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by U.S. decision-makers, including President Obama. 84  Based on this changed 
interpretation, Japan decided that it could support logistical operations in wars carried out 
by the United States.85 Along with this decision, Japan set the foundation for expanding 
its sphere of military activities from the areas around Japan to the whole world by 
revising the U.S.–Japan defense cooperation guidelines.86 This means that strengthening 
the U.S.–Japan alliance is interlocked with the expansion of Japan’s military roles and the 
establishment of strong military power that Japan’s Prime Minister Abe pursues. This 
situation can be evaluated as an outcome of the connection between Japan’s ambition to 
enlarge national leverage through a military buildup and the United States’ interest in 
continuing its rebalancing to induce a reduction in military power.87 This strengthening is 
a way for Japan to not only prepare for a response to the territorial disputes against 
China, but also to become a “normal country” able to project its armed forces without any 
restriction.88 
On the fortification of the U.S.–Japan alliance, China fears that this close defense 
tie harms China’s national interests.89 China consistently has emphasized that the U.S.–
Japan relationship must be limited to cooperative issues between both countries and 
should not be extended to interfere in other states.90 At the same time, China has formed 
a close relationship with Russia to counteract the U.S.–Japan security cooperation.91 The 
Sino–Russia tie is reacting to a perceived U.S.-centered unipolar order and consolidation 
of the U.S.–Japan alliance, and the tie tends to be strong qualitatively and quantitatively 
as the U.S.–Japan alliance becomes powerful along with the rebalancing policy.92 The 
mutual benefits of the Sino–Russia relation are that China can focus on strategic reactions 
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against the United States while getting a stable borderline situation and that Russia can 
prosecute its Siberia and Far East development strategy smoothly. 93  Consequently, 
solidification between Washington and Tokyo could be regarded as a threatening element 
by Beijing, but also the cause of regional instability through aggravation of the 
confrontation between the U.S.–Japan and Sino–Russia alliances.94 
Also, the close relationship between the United States and Japan can lead to 
fortifying the China–North Korea relationship. According to Jae-Kwan Kim, the reason 
that China sustains its relationship with North Korea is to deter the United States, which 
is rebalancing to Asia.95 The mutual cooperation treaty between China and North Korea 
includes the article of automatic intervention of China in the event of war, and based on 
this article, the Sino–Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) relationship can be 
considered close to an alliance.96 Although their closeness is sometimes doubted due to 
the fact that China does not provide any arms to North Korea in peacetime (worrying that 
this provision can be utilized as a basis by the United States to supply weapons to 
Taiwan), China would enter the Korean peninsula based on the mutual cooperation treaty 
in a time of emergency, and China sees this treaty as a method for deterring U.S. military 
activities.97 Following this recognition, it appears that China maintains the relationship 
with North Korea in order to prevent military action under the U.S.–Japan alliance that 
presumes North Korea as a threat officially. 
It is also worthwhile to consider that the strengthened U.S.–Japan relationship 
consequentially raises the security anxieties of South Korea. The United States is 
supporting the enlargement of the Japan’s self-defense rights in accordance with the 
rebalancing policy, and in this background, Japan finished modifying the interpretation of 
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its constitution and laws on September 19, 2015, in order to exercise its extended self-
defense rights.98 Due to this extension of JSDF activities, South Korea worries that the 
JSDF will enter South Korean territory if a crisis happened on the Korean peninsula.99 
Japan, of course, officially expresses that any deployments of the JSDF, including to the 
Korean peninsula, need the agreements of the involved countries.100 Considering that 
wartime operational control is not in the hands of the South Korean military, however, its 
government questions how effectively the regime can control Japan’s intervention on the 
Korean peninsula.101 Also, a Japanese official’s statement that Japan would probably 
attack North Korea directly in the case of a North Korean launch of nuclear or 
conventional missiles against the U.S. mainland is provoking the South Korean public.102 
Acknowledging this apprehensive public opinion, the Republic of Korea defense minister 
publically announced that South Korea can reject the JSDF’s employment to the Korean 
peninsula in spite of a U.S. request; however, it is not clear whether or not the U.S. 
government has consented to this kind of authority.103 
In addition to this, the expansion of the JSDF’s role can affect the military 
buildup of South Korea. Considering that Japan’s regime is showing a conservative shift 
without clear self-reflection on its history of aggression, South Korea is worried that 
Japan’s improved military power can be used in an aggressive way again. 104  Thus, 
Japan’s military advancement is a kind of potential threat that South Korea should 
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answer. On October 1, 2015, Japan set up the defense equipment agency responsible for 
armaments research, development, import, and export, and this agency was empowered 
to execute the defense budget of sixteen billion dollars, which was about forty percent of 
Japan’s total defense spending; this means that Japan is on its way to being a powerful 
military nation.105 Mixed with the expansion of its self-defense rights, the rise of Japan’s 
military can be an element that stimulates South Korea to develop its own military. 
The close U.S.–Japan tie can create regional instability as the relationship 
pressures South Korea to confront China. With the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance and the expansion of Japan’s military activity areas, Japan began joint military 
exercises with the countries that are in conflict with China on the South China Sea. For 
instance, the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces and the Philippine Navy had a joint 
exercise in May 2015, and after this exercise, the Philippine president visited Japan to 
discuss how to restrain Chinese advances into the sea.106 This vigorousness of Japan’s 
anti-Chinese activities based on the strong U.S.–Japan alliance can be a factor that pushes 
South Korea to become offensive toward China, and this offensiveness can make regional 
tensions in Northeast Asia worse. In practice, on June 3, 2015, in a U.S.–Republic of 
Korea (ROK) strategic dialogue seminar, Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russel 
encouraged South Korea to participate in the anti-China opposition in the South China 
Sea, giving rise to predictions that U.S. pressure on South Korea had begun.107 
In the case of the U.S.–ROK alliance, the strengthening of the alliance is 
progressing in the context of the rebalancing policy, and the South Korean regime also 
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welcomes this fortified relationship. 108  But China’s response is somewhat different. 
China worries that the consolidation of the relationship becomes the means to resist or 
contain China beyond North Korea, so the Chinese government wishes that South Korea 
would neglect or defect from its alliance.109  
But China’s worries and desires are both difficult to realize. First of all, the ROK–
China relationship is less tense than Sino–Japan relations not only because there is not 
any sensitive element such as a maritime dispute, but also because China maintains the 
same attitude with South Korea on North Korea’s provocations while publicly criticizing 
Pyongyang’s leadership.110 Also, considering the significance of ROK–China economic 
ties, this amicable relationship is expected to last for a while.111 So, South Korea is less 
motivated to adopt an anti-Chinese policy than Japan. At the same time, it is unrealistic 
that the U.S.–ROK relationship would be spoiled as China desires because South Korea 
would not sacrifice the alliance to become closer to China.112 Thus, although the fortified 
relationship between the United States and South Korea could cause the worried response 
of China, it can be anticipated that this improved relationship would not be linked to the 
instability of Northeast Asia. 
C. CONCLUSION 
In the diplomatic aspect of the Asia rebalancing policy, the U.S. approach of 
employing multilateral institutions for security cooperation could cause regional 
instability because it not only constructs confrontational postures within the institutions 
that China regards as a threat to Chinese security interests, but also intensifies the 
security dependency of U.S.-allied countries in Northeast Asia. Also, the bilateral 
approach, such as fortifying the alliance relationship with Japan, can lead to aggressive 
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foreign policies and unnecessary military buildups in the region as the strengthened 
relationship stimulates China’s and South Korea’s security anxieties. 
To counter this analysis, it is worthwhile to pay attention to the U.S. role within 
multilateral institutions for security cooperation. The United States utilizes multilateral 
systems for protecting the allied countries’ security interests and constructing peaceful 
relations in Northeast Asia. If any multilateral systems are invigorated in this region 
without U.S. involvement, this vitalization could result in a China-centered regional order 
and intervention in its neighboring countries’ security interests. For example, the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is thought to represent China’s interests 
enough to be recognized as an anti-U.S. defense cooperation entity beyond the concept of 
regional security cooperation. So, if the cooperation in Northeast Asia progresses within 
the U.S.-vetoed systems while China does not have the region’s trust as a responsible 
arbitrator, this cooperation can be the factor causing diplomatic conflicts with the United 
States and damaging regional security. Thus, although some tensions exist between 
Washington and Beijing, the U.S. presence in multilateral institutions for the rebalancing 
policy can be regarded as a factor raising the regional stability of Northeast Asia. 
The strengthening of U.S. relationships with allied states according to the 
rebalancing policy also contributes to the stability of Northeast Asia from the perspective 
that the fortification gives security guarantees and removes national defense anxiety. Of 
course, South Korea and Japan can adopt an aggressive anti-China posture based on the 
confidence of their close alliance relationships, and this posture can increase the 
possibility of armed conflicts. But, considering the negative military responses that can 
emerge with the weakening of the allied relationships, such as arms races and nuclear 
arming, it can be concluded that the revitalization of an alliance relationship has more 
benefits than disadvantages to regional stability. 
But, the expansion of each allied country’s role beyond the close alliance 
relationship should be reconsidered. Japan’s case is particularly problematic. Japan is 
being seen as a challenge to national security in South Korea and China as it changes the 
interpretation of its self-defense rights and extends its military role with the U.S. 
rebalancing policy. This perception can lead to the rise of mistrust among Northeast 
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Asian countries and intensification of regional conflicts. Thus, the enlargement of Japan’s 
military activity can be regarded as a harmful side effect of the rebalancing policy, and 
this should be monitored carefully. 
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III. THE MILITARY ASPECT OF THE ASIA REBALANCING 
POLICY AND ITS IMPACT ON NORTHEAST ASIA 
The U.S. National Security Strategy states that the military purpose of the U.S. 
rebalancing policy is to foster a peaceful environment in Asia region in order to “to 
enhance stability and security, facilitate trade and commerce through an open and 
transparent system, and ensure respect for universal rights and freedoms.”113 So, the 
United States will use its military forces to secure the area, allowing vigorous trade that 
can maximize the economic potential of Asia. To manage its military power, the U.S. 
government tries to diversify the force deployment and its utilization by forming security 
ties with various countries. 114  Also, the White House states that it will cope with 
common threats through international institutions such as ASEAN or the East Asia 
Summit (EAS).115 
In the National Security Strategy, the United States also clarifies that the U.S. 
military will compete with but not confront China.116 This means that the United States 
will manage the factors that can develop into armed conflicts by persuading China to act 
within the framework of international regulations.117 In addition, concerning China’s 
military modernization, the document says that the U.S. government will continue to pay 
attention to China’s military rise while seeking methods to avoid misunderstandings of 
each other’s military powers.118 
But, it seems that this peaceful intention of the U.S. military movements does not 
always produce moderate reactions in the Northeast Asian countries. According to Phillip 
C. Saunders, Washington and Beijing officially state that their stances are not hostile to 
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each other.119 The United States argues that there is no intention of containing China, and 
China also denies its ambition to be a hegemonic power by defeating the United 
States.120 But, what is important is that both states disbelieve each other’s official attitude 
due to the lack of “strategic trust” between them.121 The United States regards China’s 
Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) capabilities as threats and sees China’s military 
modernization to be mainly targeting the range of action of U.S. forces. 122  So, the 
mistrust and competition between the United States and China is obvious in Northeast 
Asia region.123  
Hence, the first unstable factor of the rebalancing policy from a military aspect 
lies in the relationship between Washington and Beijing. The next section of this chapter 
discusses that factor. The following section then focuses on how other countries’ 
reactions to U.S.-China competition functions as an “intervening variable” further 
contributing to regional instability.  
A. AIR-SEA BATTLE VS. ANTI-ACCESS/AREA-DENIAL 
From the military perspective, U.S.-China tension over the rebalancing policy is 
usually studied within the framework of confrontation between the Air-Sea Battle (ASB) 
strategy of the United States and the A2/AD strategy of China. The concept of ASB, of 
course, is not targeting China concretely; however, the operational concept of ASB is 
mostly related to China’s military capabilities. 124  Sung-kurl Kim agrees with this 
relationship between ASB and A2/AD, considering that the United States cited China as a 
threat in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). 125  This was based on the 
Chinese military’s growth both in terms of number and technological capabilities for A2/
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AD.126 In conflicts with the United States, China can aspire to reduce U.S. intelligence 
power by destroying U.S. satellites and sensors with its anti-satellite weapons or 
electronic warfare means.127 This means that the U.S. military could lose the network and 
communication capability that it has embedded and relies on in most battlefields.128 Also, 
China’s long-range guided missile system can threaten the forward-deployed Navy or Air 
Force bases and the safety of U.S. aircraft carriers, so U.S. forces can face unfavorable 
conditions when starting military operations.129 
Jae-Kwan Kim sees that the U.S. rebalancing policy is broadly perceived as a 
containment policy by the Chinese government; so, following the viewpoint of realism, 
China reacts to this policy through the A2/AD strategy accompanied by Chinese military 
modernization.130 To counter China’s A2/AD strategy, the United States tries to respond 
with the ASB concept, which focuses on neutralizing China’s missile attacks while 
maintaining the commanding lead of intelligence capability.131 Thus, the U.S. strategy 
intends to guarantee the U.S. ability to intervene while protecting U.S. core interests 
against the Chinese denial strategy.132 
In line with Jae-Kwan Kim, Seongjong Song asserts that the United States seeks 
to counter China’s strategy by introducing the ASB concept. With the development of the 
A2/AD ability, China is practicing a strategy to restrain the enemy’s actions within the 
sea line China has established.133 Under the assumption that the U.S. mainland and the 
allies’ territory could be attacked in an unexpected area and time and that these attacks 
would be conducted through various platforms of forces, the United States develops the 
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operational concept of ASB to ensure U.S. access to Asia even in the presence of 
threats.134 To fulfill ASB capabilities, a powerfully united network is essential so that the 
existing forces can operate under improved interconnectedness to guarantee the 
effectiveness of each unit.135 
In this way, the ASB strategy is seen as a China-countering method by other 
Asian countries, and this strategy can be realized by the redeployment of U.S. advanced 
weapons to Asia. Sung-kurl Kim posits that the United States is actively raising the 
forces necessary for ASB, and that this military growth is closely related to “the Asia 
rebalancing policy, reaction to A2/AD strategy, and realization of ASB.”136 According to 
his analysis, the U.S. DOD is purchasing additional weapons (albeit against the pressure 
of budget reductions); these weapons are as follows:137 
• Aegis destroyers for the Navy 
• Littoral combat ships 
• P-8A long-range maritime patrol aircraft and improved C-5 Galaxy 
• Ship-to-air and ship-to-surface missiles for the Navy 
• Air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles for the Navy and Air Force 
• Air Force KC-46A tanker 
• WIN-T combat intelligence system 
• Patriot missiles for Missile Defense  
These weapon systems have a direct connection to the practice of ASB, and the 
U.S. DOD is primarily deploying them to the Asia-Pacific region.138 This intent of the 
Pentagon was clearly expressed in the press interview that U.S. Secretary of Defense 
Carter had while visiting South Korea in April 2015. He announced that new U.S. 
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weapon systems, including stealth fighters and destroyers, electronic warfare systems, 
and cyber warfare capability, will be dispatched in the Asia-Pacific region.139 
Also, the DOD is considering how Zumwalt-class destroyers can support the ASB 
concept. The Chinese model weapons for A2 are DF-21D and submarines; without 
countermeasures against those weapons, the warfighting capabilities of the U.S. carrier 
strike groups inevitably become limited. 140  Zumwalt-class destroyers have a stealth 
ability, thus they can approach the Chinese coast while neutralizing A2 capability; also, 
by equipping the powerful anti-ship and anti-air weapons and land attacking methods, the 
destroyers are considered to be appropriate arms for ASB. 141  The U.S. government 
already stated in October 2013 that these Zumwalt-class destroyers were going to be 
deployed to the Pacific area; additionally, in June 2015, the United States announced 
through the booklet “Strategic Digest 2015” that high tech weaponry, including Zumwalt-
class destroyers, would operate in the region near South Korea.142 
In addition to the ASB, there has also been a slight change in the U.S. force 
deployment. Seongjong Song—based on his argument that the Asia rebalancing policy 
regards China as the competitor of the United States—observes that the U.S. government 
is redistributing U.S. forces in tandem with the regional partners of Asia except China in 
order to support the rebalancing policy.143 Specifically, based on the idea of “forward 
deployment,” the United States is sending additional ships, including destroyers, aircraft 
carriers, and nuclear submarines. With these forces, Washington intends to guarantee its 
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security support to its allies and secure the U.S. lead in disputes.144 The military bases 
that are provided from South Korea and Japan are expected to minimize the influence of 
future sequestration.145 In addition, for the Navy’s “offshore maritime role,” parts of the 
naval forces will move to the Southwest Pacific. With this force deployment, the United 
States aims to utilize its forces flexibly and offset political opposition to overseas 
dispatch of its armed forces.146 
This U.S. military reinforcement in Asia region seems to confront China’s 
military rise, and this confrontation intensifies the security dilemma between Washington 
and Beijing and consequently causes regional instability. 147  This can be noticed by 
looking at China’s military advancement relative to the capability of the U.S. forces and 
the credibility of its security commitment. In naval power, following the launch of its first 
aircraft carrier in 2012, China announced its plan for a new aircraft carrier in 2013 and 
has concentrated on the development of the carrier. 148  At the same time, China is 
focusing on the improved quality and quantity of its naval forces with the construction of 
nuclear-powered submarines, submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles, and 
improved battle ships with guided missiles.149 As for air power, China’s stealth fighters, 
such as Jen-20 and Jen-31, are in the final process of development, and China is working 
on a new type of air-to-air missile, named PL-15, which is able to become a critical threat 
to U.S. air power.150 U.S. Air Force Combat Commander Herbert Carlisle expressed 
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concerns that the PL-15 missile would be a serious threat to the safety of U.S. Air Force 
assets such as fighters and bombers.151 
The military parade that China showed as a part of the World War II Victory Day 
ceremony in September 2015 also reflects military competition with the United States. 
During this parade, China showed off its strategic assets, such as the DF-21D missile 
(known as an aircraft carrier killer), the DF-26 missile with the capability to attack the 
U.S. strategic base on Guam (called the Guam killer), the DF-31A missile capable of 
reaching the U.S. mainland, and the Hong-6K strategic bomber that can reach Guam and 
Hawaii.152 In this manner, China has continued its efforts to deny the approach of U.S. 
military power, and this trend of China’s weapon development might be maintained for 
many years to come.  
B. JAPAN’S MILITARY RISE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE ASIA 
REBALANCING POLICY 
Other than a military power competition stemming from China’s reaction to the 
U.S. rebalancing by the expansion of armaments, current Northeast Asia regional arms 
races are affected by other factors related to the Asia rebalancing policy. These problems 
are usually created by other states’ concerns over whether the United States will actually 
use its military power to support the rebalancing policy in practice.  
Seongjong Song points out the correlation between skepticism of the effectiveness 
of the rebalancing policy and arms races in the Asia-Pacific region.153 The doubts about 
the U.S. policy come from these events: the U.S. avoidance of military intervention on 
non-core issues such as the Ukraine crisis, the prospect that China’s military spending 
will overtake the U.S. defense expenditure for the Asia-Pacific region within twenty 
years, the negative outlook existing among the U.S. defense professionals on the 
rebalancing policy with reference to the reduction of the U.S. defense budget, and the 
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neo-isolationism rising among U.S. politicians and the public.154 He worries that the 
weakening credibility of U.S. policy can stimulate the feeling of insecurity in Asian 
countries and, going further, could create a security dilemma in this region. 155 This 
concern is based on the analysis that some Asian states would like to devise a means of 
military strengthening and the establishment of a more offensive alliance to counter the 
military development of their neighboring countries.156 The worry is gradually becoming 
true considering that Asia region’s defense expenditures have exceeded Europe’s since 
2012, driven by the efforts of specific countries to develop or introduce the newest 
weapons.157 Like this, it can be argued that, despite U.S. efforts at rebalancing, the doubt 
of Asia-Pacific countries about U.S. resources and commitment to the rebalancing policy 
is promoting their military competition.158 
A study by Byunggoo Lee shows the influence of reducing the U.S. defense 
budget. According to his analysis on the implementation of sequestration, the U.S. Army 
will reduce its number of active military roughly from 500,000 to 400,000, and the U.S. 
weapon purchasing plan has to be modified by abandoning some new purchases and 
curtailing upgrades of currently possessed weaponry.159 The U.S. Navy could reduce the 
number of carrier strike groups from eleven to ten, will inevitably delay the development 
or purchasing of battle ships, and will reconsider the scale of its introduction of new 
aircraft such as the F-35C and P-8A.160 The U.S. Air Force may retire tankers and other 
old aircraft and downsize the plan for procuring Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) such 
as the Global Hawk and Predator.161 
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This decrease of U.S. military power can cause China to undervalue the U.S. 
capability of executing its security commitments to its Northeast Asia allies, and based on 
this judgment, “China may possibly accelerate its coercive diplomatic movement against 
adjacent countries.” 162  In addition, facing a shortage of military resources for the 
rebalancing, the United States began to support Japan’s military rise in order to achieve 
strategic goals. Increases in the capabilities of Japan’s advanced military can lead to the 
increased possibility of armed conflicts between China and Japan and increase South 
Korea’s anxiety that Japan will use coercive methods, including military force, in ROK–
Japan diplomatic disputes.163 
Sung-kurl Kim insists that Japan is highly anxious that China could become a 
hegemonic power over the United States.164 As a result of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
the U.S. government faced financial difficulties that forced the implementation of 
sequestration, and this situation is perceived as stopping the rise of U.S. security 
capabilities.165 In contrast to U.S. stagnation, China is maintaining economic and military 
growth, and this development seems to outstrip Japan’s efforts to cover the power gap 
left by the United States.166 China can obtain dominance in East Asia, and considering 
the weakness of the regional security cooperation system—insufficient to check China’s 
sole lead and conflicts between nations surrounding history issues—Japan reaches the 
realistic conclusion that it has to increase its military power through its own efforts.167 
Japan recognizes that responding to China’s military buildup requires it to “be 
capable of joint operations” with the United States, which also has focused on the 
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military area in accordance with the Asia rebalancing policy.168 Following this logic, 
Japan tends to fill out the military gap that has emerged between China’s rapid military 
growth and the U.S. military pivot through Japan’s own military improvement.169 
Japan’s intention can be seen in the study of Jungchul Lee, who observes that the 
United States is preparing for military reductions due to sequestration and that Japan is 
supporting the U.S. military by filling the void created by the reduction.170 Japan’s role is 
politically possible because the strengthening of the U.S.–Japan alliance on the basis of 
the rebalancing policy is linked to the U.S. endorsement of a powerfully militarized 
Japan. Lee regards Japan’s advanced military power as the catalyst provoking military 
growth and arms races elsewhere in Northeast Asia.171 
This pattern of Japan’s militarization is somewhat different than in the past, when 
Japan used the threat of North Korea to justify improving its military power. According 
to Ho-yeob Bang, “the issues of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missiles were utilized 
to provide reasonable cause to Japan’s national strategy for nationalism.”172 In other 
words, whenever North Korea increased the level of nuclear and missile threat, Japan has 
strengthened its military forces steadily in response to the threats.173 Preceded by the 
recognition of North Korean threats, Japan not only has procured “the reasons for 
improving its military power, but also has established the complementary institutional 
basis to move to the militarized state.”174 Currently, however, Japan is relying on the 
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recognition of China’s threats—beyond North Korea—and its role as a rebalancing 
partner to justify arming with more advanced military capabilities.175 
Concretely, Japan’s military strengthening includes the following. First of all, the 
Japanese government increased defense expenditures to about five trillion yen, the 
highest defense spending since the end of the Second World War.176 Also, to prepare for 
disputes with China, Japan activated amphibian units that are similar those of the U.S. 
Marine Corps and took charge of offensive missions in the southwestern part of its 
territory; landing vehicles and MV-22 Osprey aircraft are going to be dispatched in that 
area, too. 177  The maritime Self-Defense Forces will additionally be armed with 
conventional submarines, and these submarines will be used to monitor the group of 
islands near Okinawa and the strait between Taiwan and the Philippines, where Chinese 
forces pass to move to the Pacific.178 For the Air Self-Defense Forces, F-35 fighters and 
tankers for extended range of operations will be introduced, and reconnaissance assets 
such as the Global Hawk will be reinforced to observe the areas of conflicts.179 This 
JSDF military expansion can be thought to target both Chinese threats in a narrow view 
and any potential enemies in a wide view, so this Japanese military buildup excites 
adjacent nations including China and aggravates the security dilemma and arms races in 
Northeast Asia.180 
C. CONCLUSION 
The Asia rebalancing policy is aiming for peace and prosperity in Asia region, 
and the policy intends to create peace and stability. But, due to a lack of mutual trust 
between Washington and Beijing, China misunderstands the military factors in the 
rebalancing policy, and this misconception has resulted in the military competition of the 
two powers. 
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To mediate the military tensions of Northeast Asia, the United States could avoid 
irritating China if the military factors were excluded from the rebalancing; however, the 
disappearance of U.S. military leverage in Northeast Asia could result in an extremely 
unstable security circumstance. Strategic trust in Northeast Asia is absent not only in the 
U.S.-China relation, but also in the trilateral relation of South Korea, China, and Japan. If 
U.S. military power loses its effectiveness in this situation, an arms race between other 
regional countries will become more severe. Also, considering that South Korea and 
Japan, two strong allies of the United States in Northeast Asia, are under a U.S. security 
commitment including nuclear deterrence capability, the nuclear arming of these two 
countries will be inevitable if U.S. military power decreases enough; even nuclear arms 
races can happen in Northeast Asia. So, the U.S. military policy related to the rebalancing 
policy can be regarded as beneficial to the stability of Northeast Asia region; however, it 
requires proper management of the U.S.-China competition. 
Contrary to an advantageous U.S. military presence, Japan’s military growth has a 
negative influence on regional stability. Japan’s military reinforcement is based on 
worries over U.S. failures in rebalancing and China’s military rise; however, these 
concerns are just expectations and far from the real world. The reduction of U.S. defense 
spending and military power influenced by sequestration has not happened yet; even so, it 
is uncertain how deeply the reduction will affect U.S. combat power in Northeast Asia. 
U.S. military power is still maintaining a primary position in Northeast Asia region. 
In addition, it is uncertain how far China’s military growth will be sustained. Of 
course, China’s military capability is in a different class from South Korea’s and Japan’s 
power; however, compared to the United States, China’s military is not so powerful. In 
addition, China’s economic growth rate is slowing down, and due to this, China’s 
military may lose its growth engines. This means that China’s military can fail to 
accomplish the growth expected in the current situation. So, U.S. military hegemony in 
Northeast Asia may be maintained rather than overtaken by China. Considering this 
status quo and in anticipation of its continuity, Japan’s powerful militarization is not 
essential in Northeast Asia; rather, it is unnecessary because it increases security anxiety 
in the region and fuels the possibility of arms races. 
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The reason that Japan’s militarization provokes South Korea and China is the 
worry that Japan can use its military power improperly based on an incorrect perception 
of history. Japan is neither admitting its responsibility nor apologizing for its aggressive 
behavior in the Pacific War. This attitude makes South Korea and China once again 
regard Japan as an expansionist aggressor as it becomes a powerfully militarized country. 
Considering this, South Korea and China evaluate Japan’s military buildup as threatening 
behavior. 
Also, considering that China understands Japan’s military growth as interlinked 
with the rebalancing, Japan’s pursuit of military power gives a negative image to the 
rebalancing policy by causing China to see the rebalancing as more threatening to its 
national interests.  
Holistically, U.S. military capabilities concentrating on Northeast Asia region in 
accordance with the rebalancing policy can be evaluated as contributing to regional 
stability. But, Japanese military power growing under the title of supporting the U.S. 
rebalancing has a negative impact not only because Japan’s military growth distorts the 
original purpose of the rebalancing, but also because the military buildup threatens the 
security of other Northeast Asian countries. 
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IV. THE NUCLEAR ASPECT OF THE ASIA REBALANCING 
POLICY AND ITS IMPACT ON NORTHEAST ASIA 
The U.S. rebalancing policy toward Asia is motivated to secure U.S. interests in 
the growing Asia region. With the vision of Asia’s economic burst in the near future, the 
United States concluded that the possibility of U.S. economic development was closely 
related to Asia region. So, the U.S. government seeks to improve relationships with 
regional countries and to participate in multilateral institutions in order to facilitate Asian 
economic dynamics. Along with these diplomatic efforts, the U.S. military also took the 
mission of securing the regional environment to ensure peace, stability, and the 
continuous growth of the Asian states. 
However, confrontations in Northeast Asia have become severe, and the nuclear 
issue is playing an especially prevalent role in hindering the stability and cooperation in 
this area that is necessary to mitigate confrontations and promote regional development. 
North Korea continues to improve its nuclear capabilities, and the intensity of nuclear 
threat is rising. Despite the U.S. extended deterrence commitment, the South Korean and 
Japanese publics feel some level of insecurity, and some public opinion polls in the two 
countries show support for nuclear arming. China is resisting South Korean and Japanese 
deployment of missile defense systems to protect its own security, and this Chinese 
attitude is making the security problem more difficult. 
This situation is unfavorable for the realization of the U.S. rebalancing policy. 
The rebalancing seeks a more secure regional situation for vigorous economic 
cooperation, but the current nuclear issues of the region are not being managed 
adequately and are not contributing to the U.S. goal.  
Therefore, considering this relation between the regional nuclear issues and the 
aim of the U.S. rebalancing policy, it is reasonable to discuss U.S. efforts in the nuclear 
field while evaluating the U.S. rebalancing policy. Of course, the U.S. nuclear policy is a 
global one, so the influence of the policy is not limited to Northeast Asia region. But, 
actual methods to control regional nuclear issues are provided in tailored forms, so the 
nuclear policy in Northeast Asia can be regarded as a specific one.  
 46 
In addition, the U.S. rebalancing policy is part of the U.S. grand strategy, so the 
policy is targeting more critical interests that embrace the fruits of success of the U.S. 
nuclear policy in Northeast Asia region. So, this chapter regards the U.S. nuclear policy 
in Northeast Asia as a part of the U.S. rebalancing efforts based on the viewpoint that the 
nuclear policy affects the security environment of the region, and tries to analyze how the 
U.S. rebalancing efforts with respect to the nuclear issues contribute to the regional 
stability of Northeast Asia. This analysis includes three aspects of U.S. efforts on the 
nuclear problems of Northeast Asia region: extended deterrence commitments, efforts to 
denuclearize North Korea, and controlling nuclear ambition in South Korea and Japan.  
A. EXTENDED DETERRENCE COMMITMENT 
The concept of extended deterrence began with the North Atlantic Treaty, which 
launched the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949.181 In 1954, through 
U.S. nuclear strategy documents and the speech of former Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles, extended deterrence was settled as a method of security assurance to allied 
countries; shortly after this, South Korea and Japan—the U.S. key allies in Northeast 
Asia—were included under extended deterrence. 182  Japan began receiving extended 
deterrence coverage based on “the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security” of 
1960.183 In the case of South Korea, the U.S.–ROK Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953 
contained the idea that the United States would protect South Korea from the threat of 
North Korea, meaning that the establishment of the U.S.–ROK alliance itself was the 
starting point of supplying extended deterrence to South Korea.184  
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In contrast to the fact that extended deterrence is a crucial security measure to the 
U.S. allies of Northeast Asia, extended deterrence is not welcomed by China. According 
to Linton Brooks and Mira Rapp-Hooper, there are two kinds of Chinese reactions to the 
U.S. extended deterrence. First of all, China focuses not only on the loss of mutual 
vulnerability between the United States and China by the dispatch of the U.S. missile 
defense system, but also on the notion that Chinese nuclear arsenals can be destroyed by 
U.S. precision attack munitions.185 Jennifer Bradley gives a more specific explanation 
for China’s concern. In the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the United States 
announced a strategy that the U.S. could attack the targets of U.S. nuclear adversaries 
with conventional weapons on the basis of improved precision attack capabilities.186 The 
problem is that these conventional forces have a higher possibility of being used than 
nuclear weapons do, and this possibility can create security vulnerability for an 
opponent.187 This concept stems from the point that conventional forces are not under 
the influence of a “nuclear taboo.”188 
China’s other worry about extended deterrence is that the U.S. allies with 
extended deterrence become emboldened by the U.S. commitment. 189  Especially in 
Northeast Asia, this Chinese concern could become a reality through the conflict over the 
Senkaku (Diaoyu in Chinese) Islands. For instance, the U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation 
Guideline—which was revised in April 2015—specifies the role of U.S. “strike power” 
while countering an attack on Japan.190 Although the role is limited to support of the 
JSDF, this is meaningful because the involvement of U.S. armed forces is almost assured 
if armed conflict between Japanese and Chinese navy and air powers occurs in the 
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Senkaku Islands.191 It is possible for China to expect that Japan, knowing that U.S. 
involvement is assured, will choose a more aggressive policy in a situation in which 
conflict may be imminent. In its official reaction to the revision of the U.S.–Japan 
Defense Cooperation Guideline, China raised the level of tension by condemning the 
U.S. intervention and warning that the United States and Japan should not undervalue 
China’s capabilities to resist their joint efforts.192 
The U.S. extended deterrence commitment and China’s fear of aggressive 
reactions to the U.S. security provision remain an unsolved problem. To dispel China’s 
worries and to let China believe that the U.S. extended deterrence policy will not threaten 
China, the United States needs to improve its relationship with China. What the United 
States fears, however, is that an advanced relationship with China is perceived as 
weakening its security guarantee to South Korea and Japan, and based on this assessment, 
the two allies would defect from the nonproliferation efforts of international society.193 
Brooks and Rapp-Hooper names this the “security trilemma,” and this trilemma is still 
harassing the United States as the unsettled issue of Northeast Asia.194 
From the perspective of receiving extended deterrence, South Korea and Japan 
can react in ways that make the security circumstance unstable if they believe there are 
problems with the credibility of extended deterrence. According to a study by Wade 
Huntley, extended deterrence to South Korea and Japan could be affected by the U.S. 
nuclear disarmament policy. To Japan, it was a problem that the U.S. extended deterrence 
might not operate credibly due to the U.S. downsized nuclear arsenals. 195  Another 
problem was that, in the situation that the quantity of U.S. nuclear weapons shrank to the 
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same amount as China, it would be difficult to deter  provocative Chinese behavior, such 
as local disputes surrounding the Senkaku Islands.196 
In South Korea, extended deterrence was questioned due to North Korea’s 
continuous nuclear development and military provocations, China’s military 
modernization, and the U.S. nuclear arms reduction and its posture of departing from 
dependence on nuclear weapons.197 For these reasons, South Korea considered whether 
U.S. extended deterrence—predicated upon U.S. nuclear retaliation—was less credible 
for conflicts in Northeast Asia that are smaller and involve only conventional 
weapons. 198  On this basis, concern over the credibility of extended deterrence was 
aroused, and this was linked to South Korean reactions, especially South Korean 
discussion of the return of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons or possession of the independent 
capability of producing nuclear weapons. 
Huntley says that the United States managed Japan’s concerns not only through 
providing reassurance to Japan by producing the U.S. strategy documents containing the 
U.S. extended deterrence commitment, but also expressing the U.S. intention of 
supplying conventional efforts in low-level conflicts in accordance with the concept of 
“dynamic deterrence.”199 Also, he points out that the scenario of U.S.-China nuclear 
equivalence is unlikely because U.S. nuclear disarmament will not take the direction of 
yielding nuclear superiority to China. 200  Regarding South Korea’s apprehensions, 
nuclear deterrence against attacks to U.S. allies can be achieved by the nuclear forces of 
the U.S. mainland, and what is needed in deterring local conflicts such as the attacks on 
ROK Nave corvette Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island is “tailored conventional 
capabilities,” not deployment of nuclear arms in South Korea. 201  Because nuclear 
weapons in South Korea are not credible for retaliation against North Korea’s local and 
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conventional provocations, it is essential to express credibility in other ways, like 
announcing that the United States and South Korea will react firmly against North 
Korea’s military action.202 
In contrast to the difficulties in controlling China’s reaction to extended 
deterrence, control of the reactions of South Korea and Japan was successful. The U.S. 
extended deterrence commitment still has crucial meaning to the security of the two 
allies, and the deep trust of the two countries in the extended deterrence commitment 
seems to be unchangeable for a while. The key variable that could change the current 
climate is if China’s fast-rising nuclear capabilities increasingly threaten the two U.S. 
allies’ security, and in that situation, abandonment of the U.S nuclear disarmament policy 
and an altered nuclear strategy in Northeast Asia will be inevitable.203 
B. DENUCLEARIZATION OF NORTH KOREA 
The Obama administration’s policy to denuclearize North Korea is called 
“strategic patience.”204 This means that the United States continues to pressure North 
Korea while waiting for it to return to the negotiation table. 205  The major tools to 
pressure North Korea are utilizing regulations of the international society, acquiring 
cooperation of the neighboring countries, and imposing sanctions.206 
At the international level, the U.S. has led diverse efforts worldwide toward 
regulating North Korea on the basis of United Nations (UN) resolutions. To gain the 
cooperation of adjacent countries, the United States has been concurrently working with 
South Korea and Japan and has requested China to take a stronger posture toward North 
Korea. 207  In addition to these methods, Washington has been imposing economic 
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sanctions autonomously. These sanctions started with the Bush administration’s focus on 
the interdiction of the circulation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); with the 
Obama administration, the targets of sanctions have been extended to include all of North 
Korea’s weapons and luxury items. 208  Also, in order to raise the efficiency of the 
sanctions, efforts to control trade with North Korean companies that are related to the 
circulation of targeted materials have been combined with the sanctions.209 
But, North Korea’s reaction to the diplomatic and economic efforts of the 
international society and the United States has been expressed in unexpected and 
unintended ways. According to John Park, the pressures on North Korea made North 
Korea’s acquisition routes more complex and advanced, rather than blocking the 
acquisition of materials related to nuclear development. 210  Under the restriction of 
international society and the United States, North Korea experienced a certain level of 
difficulty in acquiring equipment for its nuclear development; however, North Korea 
overcame this situation through increasing trade with China.211 Ethnic Chinese with 
Korean language skills especially contributed to North Korea’s procurement of nuclear 
development tools in China. These ethnic Chinese benefitted from their ability to cross 
the border between China and North Korea freely. 212 Thus, these middlemen could 
purchase nuclear-related equipment from foreign companies located in China without any 
restrictions and sell the equipment to North Korea.213 
Reportedly, China also benefitted economically from this trade with North Korea. 
As North Korea’s trading routes became limited by the international sanctions, North 
Korea had no other option but to rely on its trade with China, and this meant that China’s 
                                                 
208 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Acquisition of Technology, 7. 
209 Ibid. 
210 John S. Park, “The Key to the North Korean Targeted Sanctions Puzzle,” The Washington 
Quarterly (November 2014): 207, https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/
Park_Fall2014.pdf. 
211 Ibid., 202. 
212 Ibid., 208. 
213 Ibid. 
 52 
dealers could take better profits from their business with North Korea.214 According to 
the statements of North Korean defectors, the trading commissions Chinese dealers 
demanded from North Korean traders increased after the U.S. and UN sanctions, and the 
increased profits that Chinese traders could get were a factor that made China–DPRK 
trade more vigorous.215 Ironically, a variety of sanctions that are imposed by the United 
States and international organizations have made North Korea more uncontrollable by 
causing North Korea to devise advanced ways to sustain its nuclear development trade 
anyway.216 
The next goal of North Korea would be to decrease dependency upon China and 
to assure profits through other countries apart from China.217 In order to control this 
situation and to induce North Korea to negotiate, the United States and the UN need to 
curtail the new routes of North Korea’s trade.218 For instance, efforts to detect North 
Korea’s international trading groups that are concealed by China’s large economic scale 
and complex international ports would be effective.219 Furthermore, as Kim’s regime 
starves for resources, efforts by North Korea to open business with rogue states and 
terrorists should be searched for and blocked.220 
The Chinese reaction to the U.S. policy to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula 
diverges from the U.S. intention. Chinese cooperation is necessary to denuclearize North 
Korea, but China’s attitude is currently ambiguous. China officially supports the 
denuclearization of North Korea; however, China also wishes to maintain North Korea’s 
current regime due to the geopolitical value of North Korea and economic benefits 
stemming from trade with North Korea.221 These benefits impede China’s joining the 
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U.S. and international efforts to press North Korea’s regime and to follow through with 
denuclearization on the Korean peninsula.  
C. CONTROLLING SOUTH KOREA AND JAPAN 
There is strong evidence that Japan—one of the solid U.S. allies in Northeast 
Asia—could become a nuclear-armed state. First is the estimation that there would be 
almost no technical limitation for Japan to possess its own nuclear weapons. This 
judgment is underpinned by Japan’s spent nuclear fuel reprocessing technology, 
plutonium possession, and H-IIA rocket launching technology. Second, the historical fact 
that Japan tried to develop nuclear weapons during the Second World War shows past 
interest. Not only was Japan investing in a nuclear weapon program while the Second 
World War was in progress, but even after Prime Minister Sato declared the Three 
Nonnuclear Principles, Japanese officials reportedly pursued joint nuclear weapon 
development with German scientists. 222  Finally, adding to the technological and 
historical possibilities, it can be anticipated that a nuclear-armed Japan could result if 
Japan decides that U.S. extended deterrence has lost credibility. U.S. extended deterrence 
has been a major factor that has controlled Japan’s aspiration for nuclear arming.223 The 
flipside of this fact is that Japan’s potential pursuit of nuclear attack capabilities will 
increase only when extended deterrence does not assure security in Japan.224 
South Korea’s breakout is potentially possible for similar reasons: South Korea 
could strive to deter its security threats with its own nuclear ability if U.S. extended 
deterrence does not seem to be credible. Considering that South Korea endeavored to 
make nuclear bombs twice in 1970 and 1977, it is conceivable that South Korea will 
attempt to make nuclear weapons again. The announcement of the reduction of U.S. 
forces in South Korea in 1970 damaged the credibility of the U.S. security commitment, 
and lowered credibility was connected to South Korea’s pursuit of independent national 
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defense capabilities and nuclear weapon development.225 The attempt in 1977 happened 
due to a rise in South Korea’s security anxiety after President Jimmy Carter tried to 
withdraw all U.S. forces from the Korean peninsula.226 Similar security concerns have 
emerged in South Korean society after several long-range missile tests and nuclear tests 
by North Korea. In a poll conducted after North Korea’s nuclear test in 2013, more than 
half of the participants answered that they felt a necessity to possess or make nuclear 
weapons, and opposition to nuclear armament had decreased from previous poll 
results.227 
Therefore, if desires for nuclear arsenals are not managed properly, both South 
Korea and Japan could evacuate from international nonproliferation efforts, and this 
breakout will cause complex problems. First of all, if any of both allies starts its nuclear 
weapon program, this fact can influence the nonproliferation will of other country, even 
Taiwan. This means that justification of nuclear weapons in one country can serve as the 
basis for others’ nuclearizing because South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan have similar 
security environments. Furthermore, if South Korea moves to obtain nuclear arms, this 
will drive the impossibility of denuclearization of North Korea. This is because South 
Korea’s nuclear weapons will create a new cause to drive North Korea’s nuclear research 
and nuclear weapon production. Also, taking into account that China that does not 
welcome any kind of conflict on the Korean peninsula, South Korea’s nuclear arsenals 
will stimulate China’s antagonism, making China’s cooperation for denuclearization 
more impossible. 
To avoid this complex situation caused by South Korea’s or Japan’s nuclear 
arming, the United States has tried to improve the reliability of extended deterrence. With 
regard to Japan, it is appropriate that the U.S. extended deterrence commitment focuses 
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on useful conventional weapons rather than nuclear weapons because the most likely 
threats Japan faces are low-level conflicts, not full-scale wars, and convergence on this 
perspective has already formed between Washington and Tokyo.228 In addition to this 
shared notion, the establishment of a missile defense system and the presence of U.S. 
forces in Japan provide security assurance to the Japanese government, thus Japan can 
recede from the security goal of nuclear weapon possession.229 
Extended deterrence also functions as a key element inhibiting South Korea from 
seeking nuclear arms. The role of extended deterrence for South Korea is stipulated in the 
joint statement of the 2009 Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), which describes the 
joint roles of “the U.S. nuclear umbrella, conventional attack capabilities, and missile 
defense capabilities.” 230 Furthermore, to upgrade the effectiveness and credibility of 
extended deterrence, the United States and South Korea agreed to establish the Extended 
Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC) and conduct regular extended deterrence method 
operating exercises, also known as Table Top Exercises (TTXs).231 Specifically, TTX is 
providing opportunities to train to use the assets of extended deterrence in response to 
North Korean attacks and what procedures should be followed in the process of decision-
making. 232  It is unclear how effectively and concretely extended deterrence will be 
improved through these institutions because they do not strongly contribute to 
demonstrate the U.S. will to retaliate against North Korea, but these systems do 
successfully quash the security concerns of South Korean policy-makers and any 
motivation for nuclear armament. 
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The U.S. policy of rebalancing toward Asia is closely related to the security 
environment of Asia. In Northeast Asia, the rebalancing policy focuses on accelerating 
cooperation between regional countries and maximizing economic prosperity, and for this 
goal, the security of each country has to be guaranteed. From the perspective that the 
nuclear issue of Northeast Asia has great effects on regional security, emphasis on the 
nuclear issue is essential in discussing the rebalancing policy in Northeast Asia.  
In this chapter, the effects of U.S. nuclear-related efforts toward Northeast Asia 
were evaluated through three aspects: extended deterrence, denuclearization of North 
Korea, and management of South Korea’s and Japan’s nuclear desires. The positive 
assessment can be made that extended deterrence with improved credibility has provided 
security confidence to the allied states of Northeast Asia and has successfully controlled 
their desire for nuclear weapons. However, more time is needed to evaluate U.S. efforts 
to control China’s aggressive reaction appropriately and to denuclearize North Korea. 
Taken as a whole, U.S. nuclear policy can synthetically be evaluated as not only 
contributing to Northeast Asia region’s security in ways essential to the realization of the 
U.S. rebalancing goal, but also benefiting regional stability. This evaluation can be 
supported with the observation that U.S. extended deterrence has played a critical role to 
keep South Korea and Japan from nuclear arming options by providing solutions to each 
states’ security problems. Also, any military tension generated by extended deterrence 
cannot be seen to contribute to regional instability because other sources of antagonism 
among South Korea, Japan, and China—possibly originating from historical facts or 
China’s military rising—would not be controlled any more effectively if U.S. extended 
deterrence loses its credibility. In addition, although the sanctions applied to North Korea 
have not achieved much toward its denuclearization up to now, a positive expectation for 
these sanctions is possible in the long term because those efforts will constantly weaken 




This thesis focused on evaluating whether or not the Asia rebalancing policy has 
contributed to the regional stability of Northeast Asia. Motivated by assessments of the 
economic potential of the Asian region, the United States started its rebalancing efforts 
toward the region. The rebalancing policy was designed to improve both relationships 
and cooperation with regional states and also to maximize the economic dynamics of 
Asia by supporting a peaceful security environment.  
But, in Northeast Asia, the regional situation does not seem to support the goal of 
the U.S. policy. Despite the rebalancing efforts by the United States, the Northeast Asian 
states are still facing several security issues. Although the relationship among them has 
improved, it is not enough to produce an economic boom. So, this thesis has analyzed 
three aspects—diplomatic, military, and nuclear—of the Asia rebalancing policy, while 
concentrating on the reactions of the regional players toward the U.S. approach. 
With respect to the diplomatic aspect, the Asia rebalancing policy is contributing 
to the stable security environment of Northeast Asia. The United States has approached 
this region in two ways: participating in multilateral systems for cooperation and 
strengthening its bilateral relationships with the regional countries. The U.S. efforts to 
approach through multilateral security institutions are conflicting with China’s resistance 
because of China’s worries of harm to its national interests. Due to this resistance, 
cooperation in multilateral systems is difficult. The presence of the United States in 
multilateral systems, however, is necessary to prevent the emergence of China-centered 
regional institutions, in which regional countries—except China—would not be able to 
pursue their national rights and could see their national interests harmed. Likewise, the 
U.S. bilateral approach is significant for two key allies in Northeast Asia—South Korea 
and Japan—because strengthening of alliances means increased security assurance for 
them. In addition, this consolidation of alliances functions as a deterrent of an arms race 
and nuclear arming. 
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With respect to the military aspect, the U.S. rebalancing effort toward Asia is 
playing a vital role in guaranteeing the secure environment for South Korea and Japan. 
So, U.S. military efforts could be seen as a contribution to regional stability. Although the 
ASB concept seems to confront the Chinese A2/AD strategy and promote military 
tensions in Northeast Asia, regional countries would experience a serious security 
vacuum if U.S. military power decreases. As a result, this feeling of insecurity could 
cause a dangerous military competition between Northeast Asian states. In this sense, 
U.S. military presence and its fortification would be beneficial to peaceful relationships 
within the region. Another element that could cause unstable reactions by the regional 
nations is a concern that sequestration could weaken U.S. military capability. This future 
prospect not only could make China more emboldened and aggressive to neighboring 
countries, but it could also motivate Japan to build up its military power. However, 
considering that U.S. military power in Northeast Asia is thriving and that the influence 
of sequestration in the regions is still uncertain, one could expect that the strong U.S. 
security guarantee accompanied by the Asia rebalancing policy would last and positively 
affect regional stability.  
With respect to the nuclear aspect, this thesis assumed that the U.S. nuclear policy 
in Northeast Asia is part of the U.S. rebalancing efforts. This assumption is based on the 
judgments that the nuclear issues of the region are closely related to the realization of the 
goals of the rebalancing policy and that the regionally tailored nuclear policy can be 
subjected to the Asia rebalancing policy. The U.S. nuclear efforts in this region have been 
analyzed in three different aspects and evaluated as positive contributors to regional 
stability. U.S. extended deterrence commitments and related U.S. capabilities have 
successfully assured security for both South Korea and Japan. As a result, these countries 
have little desire for nuclear arming despite the reduction of U.S. nuclear arsenals. 
Moreover, the efforts to mitigate Chinese concerns over U.S. extended deterrence 
commitments and to denuclearize North Korea are being continued, so positive progress 
on these issues will likely appear in the near future. 
Considering the brief history of the Asia rebalancing policy, it is too early to 
determine if the policy is or will be effective. But, so far, the policy has been successful 
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at contributing to regional stability in Northeast Asia. Moreover, investigation of the 
hypothesis of this thesis—the Asia rebalancing policy affects Northeast Asia stability and 
instability through the Northeast Asian countries’ various reactions to the U.S. 
rebalancing—has shown that the role of these other states can be a critical factor. U.S. 
efforts to meet the rise of China by maintaining its diplomatic and military presence in 
Northeast Asia will not contribute to stability if it also promotes a broad arms race among 
all the countries of the region. Also, the importance of extended nuclear deterrence to 
Japan and South Korea is clearly a crucial factor influencing how U.S. nuclear policy 
affects stability in Northeast Asia.   
The important intermediate role that these other countries play in shaping regional 
stability outcomes is likely to continue. There are several elements that can change 
regional stability conditions in the future. 
First, China’s antagonism toward U.S. rebalancing must be properly managed. 
China is resisting various elements of the rebalancing policy: the U.S. multilateral and 
bilateral diplomatic approaches, the ASB concept and dispatch of high-tech weapons, and 
continued security commitments to U.S. allies. This attitude stems from China’s worries 
that Washington is trying to contain Beijing, and because of this, it could very well raise 
tensions in Northeast Asia. The United States has tried to overcome this distrust through 
bilateral meetings and official announcements. These positive efforts could be an answer 
to managing China’s distrust and antagonism towards the United States. But, considering 
that the mutual trust between Washington and Beijing is imperfect, both countries should 
be careful in maintaining their fragile relationship. If the distrust between the two 
escalates through a future dispute, China could reposition itself as fully hostile to U.S. 
rebalancing efforts. This hostility could cause a U.S.-China confrontation that could harm 
the regional stability of Northeast Asia. 
Second, a strong security commitment by the United States has to be maintained 
in Northeast Asia. Any decline in the credibility of U.S. security commitments may cause 
several negative situations that could contribute to regional instability. China may 
consider the weakening of U.S. credibility as a chance to expand its leverage on 
conflictual issues, and this development could threaten the national interests of South 
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Korea and Japan. To respond to China, the two states might take offensive diplomatic and 
military postures rather than concede and cooperate with China. Also, weakening U.S. 
security capability provides a motivation for Japan to strengthen its military power, 
which may cause security anxiety in neighboring countries. In addition, weakening U.S. 
power could result in nuclear arming of South Korean and Japan, both of which are 
completely relying on the U.S. extended deterrence commitment on nuclear issues. 
Finally, a framework to manage military competition is needed in Northeast Asia. 
Japan’s military growth and the expansion of its action areas, accompanied by the U.S. 
rebalancing policy, are seen as a threat by South Korea as well as China. South Korea 
worries that Japan will advance to the Korean peninsula in an emergency, and China 
worries that Japan will become more aggressive in maritime disputes in the East China 
Sea. Currently, it seems impossible to restrain Japan’s military development. Considering 
that it is mutually beneficial to President Obama’s rebalancing policy and Prime Minister 
Abe’s political goals, Japan’s military development is likely to continue. Mixed with 
China’s military rise and South Korea’s military modernization, Japan’s pursuit of 
military power can lead to military collisions in Northeast Asia, where trust among 
regional states is not strong. So, to avoid armed conflicts, promote the level of mutual 
trust, and establish a secure environment necessary for the realization of the Asia 
rebalancing policy, institutional tools for managing conflict and building trust are 
essential in the region. 
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